Abstract: This paper provides a detailed analysis of the call auction procedure on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Its main contribution is to develop a direct measure of the execution costs in a call auction that is comparable to the bid-ask spread in a continuous market. Applying that measure, we find that transaction costs for small transactions in the call market are lower than the quoted spread in the order book of the continuous market whereas transaction costs for large transactions in the call market are higher than the spread in the continuous market. An analysis of specialist (Makler) participation shows that the Maklers provide a valuable service to the market. On average, they do not earn profits on the positions they take. Their compensation is thus restricted to the commissions they receive.
liquidity of these markets. To shed light on the function of the specialist in a call auction we analyze his impact on transaction prices and measure the profitability of the trades he makes for his own account. Our study thus contributes to the understanding of the economic function of specialists in a call market.
Our paper is related to recent work by Amihud / Mendelson / Lauterbach (1997) , Brooks / Su (1997) and Madhavan / Panchapagesan (1998) . Amihud / Mendelson / Lauterbach (1997) analyze the gradual transfer of stocks from call market trading to continuous trading on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. Using event study methodology they find that switching to continuous trading is associated with significant positive abnormal returns. They further document that liquidity increases after the introduction of continuous trading. There are two important differences between their work and ours. First, they compare a situation where stocks are traded exclusively in a call market to a situation where they are traded continuously. Second, they do not measure the execution cost in the call auction directly but rely on proxy measures like trading volume and the liquidity ratio developed by Cooper / Groth / Avera (1985) . 1 Brooks / Su (1997) compare execution costs in the NYSE opening call auction and the continuous trading session. Their approach is similar to ours in that they compare the price at which an additional order would have been filled in the opening auction to the price at which it would have been filled in the continuous trading session. They assume, however, that the order, if submitted to the call auction, would have been executed at the actual opening price. This is equivalent to assuming that an order submitted to the call auction does not have a price impact.
2 They conclude that a small liquidity trader can reduce transaction costs by trading in the opening call auction rather than in the continuous market. This result stands in contrast to the conclusion of Amihud / Mendelson / Lauterbach (1997) .
These contradictory findings are probably due to the different measures of liquidity. The measure developed in the present paper explicitly takes into account the fact that the submission of an additional order to the call auction may cause the price to change, i.e., we allow for a non-zero price impact. Our data set is unique in that it contains information about all individual orders for a sample of stocks traded on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE). It allows us to calculate the price that would have obtained after inclusion of an additional order.
This results in a direct measure of the price impact comparable to the bid-ask spread in a continuous trading session. We find that transaction costs for small transactions in the call market are lower than the quoted spread in the order book of the continuous market, whereas transaction costs for large transactions in the call market are higher than the spread in the continuous market. Our results thus support the findings of Brooks / Su (1997) . They are, however, based on a direct measurement of the execution costs in a call market rather than on assumptions concerning these costs.
The Frankfurt Stock Exchange, like the NYSE, currently relies on a specialist (the Makler)
who has some latitude in price setting and may trade for his own account. The presence of an intermediary may be desirable because he accommodates order imbalances and thus increases the liquidity of the market. At the same time the latitude he enjoys in price setting and his monopolistic access to order book information give him an incentive to manipulate prices. Stoll / Whaley (1990) argue that this may increase return volatility.
Our data set allows us to identify the trades the Makler made for his own account. We can thus eliminate his trades and determine the price that would have obtained without his participation.
Comparing this hypothetical price series to the actual transaction prices, we find that Makler participation reduces return volatility. A further analysis shows that the actual prices are much closer to the surrounding prices of the continuous trading session than the hypothetical prices that would have obtained without his participation. These results indicate that the Makler provides a valuable service to the market. We further calculate the profits associated with the positions taken by the Makler and find that, on average, he does not earn profits. His compensation is thus restricted to the commission he receives. These results are consistent with those reported by Madhavan / Panchapagesan (1998) . They analyze the opening auction at the NYSE and find that specialist participation enhances price discovery and reduces return variability. They also find that the specialists' trading decisions are affected by inventory considerations. The returns earned on the specialists' transactions are modest.
Our results have important policy implications. A measure of the execution costs in a call auction is a prerequisite for resolving the trade-off between the reduction in transaction costs through the temporal consolidation of the order flow on the one hand and the reduced accessibility of the market on the other hand. Application of the measure may help to answer 
Data
We obtained our data set from a regulatory unit at the exchange (Handelsüberwachungsstelle).
It was augmented by the hand-written notes of the Maklers which contain transactions resulting from orders not routed electronically into the order book but communicated verbally on the floor.
The final data set contains the complete order book for each of the three daily call auctions.
We also obtained all bid and ask quotes and the order book prior to each transaction of the 
Trading Volume in the Call and Continuous Markets
The co-existence of call auctions and continuous trading sessions offers market participants the opportunity to choose between two different trading mechanisms. Both Admati / Pfleiderer (1988) and Spiegel / Subrahmanyam (1995) show that liquidity traders who enjoy a certain degree of latitude in the timing of their trades have an incentive to pool their trades. In Spiegel / Subrahmanyam (1995) (Pagano / Röell 1990 .
It is often hypothesized that call markets are especially suited to low-volume stocks (see for example Stoll 1985) . This is supported by empirical evidence indicating that adverse information is a more severe problem for less liquid stocks (Easley et al. 1996 and studies analyzing the components of the spread, e.g. Stoll 1989 , George et al. 1991 . These arguments lead to the hypothesis that the fraction of the trading volume in the call markets is negatively related to total trading volume and market capitalization. the only difference is that the correlation between market capitalization and the percentage volume of the opening auction is significant only at the 10% level. These results are consistent with those reported by Stoll / Whaley (1990) , Lehman / Modest (1994) and Schmidt et al. (1995) and lend strong support to the hypothesis that the advantages of call market trading are more pronounced for less liquid stocks.
We proceed by asking whether there are systematic differences between the orders that are submitted to the call auction and those submitted to the continuous trading session. Traders face a trade-off between immediate order execution which is only possible in the continuous market and transaction costs which may be lower in the call auction. Analyzing the average transaction size may shed light on the question of whether this leads to a self-selection "bias". Table 2 gives the average size of limit orders that were executed in the three call auctions and the continuous auction.
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Insert Table 2 about here
The figures show that, as expected, the average order size is much lower in the noon auction.
The table also reveals a distinct pattern of the order size in the opening and closing auction and the continuous trading session. The average size of executed orders in the continuous trading session is higher than the order size in the opening auction but lower than the order size in the closing auction.
The closing auction is special not only with respect to order size. The number of executed limit orders in the closing auction is low despite a considerable trading volume. Even for the most liquid stocks it frequently happens that no limit order is executed in the closing auction. This suggests that the closing auction is used to match market orders at a price set by the Makler.
The high average order size is consistent with market participants desiring to close positions at the end of the trading session. This is evidence of inventory control similar to that predicted by Brock / Kleidon (1992) and documented empirically by Chan et al. (1995) .
The Cost of Transacting in Call and Continuous Markets
The observation documented in Table 1 that call markets are particularly attractive to the trading of low volume stocks suggests that there are differences in execution costs between call and continuous markets and that these differences are related to firm size. There are two arguments in support of this view.
First, the call market protects limit order traders from being "picked off" because their orders are executed at the market clearing price rather than at the specified limit price. Second, potential insider profits (and thus losses incurred by uninformed traders) are smaller in a call market than in a continuous market because there is only one transaction at a single market clearing price and the insider is, therefore, not able to price discriminate. 12 Both arguments imply that there is a greater incentive in a call market to supply liquidity through limit orders and less need to adjust the price limit to account for the adverse selection problem. This, in turn, implies that transaction costs are lower in the call market. Given the evidence that the degree of informational asymmetry is higher for low-volume stocks (e.g., Easley et al. 1996) , it is also plausible that the relative advantage of call market trading is higher for less liquid
stocks.
An empirical comparison of the execution costs in call and continuous markets requires the existence of a valid measure of the execution costs. In a continuous market these costs can readily be measured by the bid-ask spread. Assuming that the spread midpoint is the best available estimate of the asset's value from the point of view of an uninformed investor, the spread measures the difference between this value estimate and the transaction price and is, therefore, a valid measure of the execution cost.
In a call market no explicit bid-ask spread exists. It is, however, possible to construct a measure that is directly comparable to the bid-ask spread. We again take the point of view of an uninformed investor and assume that the market clearing price resulting without her order is the best estimate of the asset value available to her. If she submits an order this may cause the market clearing price to change. The difference between the market clearing price with and without her order is a valid measure of the price impact of her order and, therefore, of the execution cost.
Since our data set contains information on all orders submitted to the call auction we can measure this price impact of an individual order. We proceed as follows. together, these arguments imply that investors cannot easily condition their orders on the anticipated behavior of the Makler. Therefore, the shift in strategy by limit order traders in the absence of the Makler is unlikely to be an important factor. Our next step is to calculate the market clearing price using the order book information. It is defined as the price that maximizes the trading volume in shares. If there is no single market clearing price we choose the price in the middle of the interval of market clearing prices.
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In order to measure the price impact of an additional order we recalculate the market clearing price after adding, first, a market buy and, second, a market sell order to the order book. We choose two different order sizes: one round lot and the average transaction size of the stock, rounded to the next round lot. With two order sizes we are able to address the issue of market depth. Our estimate of the bid-ask spread in the call market is simply the sum of the price impact of a buy order and a sell order of equal size. We calculate the measure separately for the opening, noon, and closing auctions. This distinction is useful given the different average order sizes documented in Table 2 .
The results presented in Table 3 show that execution costs for small trades in the call auction are low. The average is 0.332% for the opening auction, 0.15% for the noon auction and 0.162% for the closing auction. Higher transaction costs at the opening indicate that a given order imbalance has a larger price impact. Our result is thus consistent with the finding by Amihud / Mendelson (1987) and others that the volatility of open-to-open returns is larger than the volatility of close-to-close returns.
Transaction costs for large transactions are much higher. This is, of course, not surprising.
What is surprising, however, is the magnitude of the increase. The average execution costs for large transactions are 2.369%, 1.596% and 1.423% for the opening, noon, and closing auction, respectively. They are thus approximately seven to ten times as high as those for small transactions. 14 This is evidence of insufficient market depth. Again, transaction costs at the opening auction are higher.
Transaction costs decrease almost monotonically across trading volume quintiles. The correlation between the average transaction cost in the call auction and the log of the total trading volume is -0.76 for the small transaction size and -0.62 for the large transaction size.
Insert Table 3 about here
The figures in Table 3 allow a direct comparison of the transaction costs in the call market to those in the continuous auction. We use two measures of transaction costs for the continuous market. The first is the book spread, defined as the spread calculated from the orders in the order book. 15 It is comparable to the transaction cost measure for the call market because it is calculated on the basis of customer orders only. The effective spread, which measures the cost ultimately borne by the investors, is lower than the book spread for two reasons. First, the spread quoted by the Makler is usually inside the book spread, reflecting his willingness to trade for his own account. Second, more than 45% of the transactions occur at prices inside the quoted spread (Freihube et al. 1999) . The effective spread is calculated separately for small and large transactions where a small transaction is defined as a transaction with a DM volume smaller than the median transaction size for the stock in question.
The bid-ask spread for the small transaction size in the call market is significantly lower (tvalue 2.76, z-value from Mann-Whitney u-test 2.99, both tests based on results for individual stocks) than the book spread in the continuous auction. However, for large transactions the spread in the call market is significantly larger than the spread in the continuous auction (tvalue 1.92, z-value 2.55). These results imply that small orders, but not large orders, may obtain better execution in the call market.
If alternatively the effective spread is used as the transaction cost measure in the continuous market, the spread for the small transaction size in the call market is, on average, still smaller than the effective spread for small orders, but the difference is not significant (t-value 0.24, zvalue 0.93). For large orders, the spread in the call market is significantly larger than the effective spread in the continuous market (t-value 2.60, z-value 3.84). Note, however, that the effective spread already incorporates any reduction in transaction costs brought about by the activity of the Makler whereas the transaction cost measure for the call market does not.
The hypothesis that call market trading is relatively better suited for small firms' stocks than a continuous trading mechanism implies that the relation between the execution costs and firm size is flatter in the call market. To test this hypothesis we estimated the following regression: 
The positive coefficient β1 captures the observation, already documented in Table 3 , that the transaction costs for small trades in the call market are significantly lower than the book spread in the continuous auction. Transaction costs decline with both market capitalization and turnover and increase with return volatility. Both interaction terms are negative although only β5 is individually significantly different from zero. A F-test rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the interaction terms are jointly zero. This indicates that the inverse relationship between market capitalization and transaction costs is less pronounced in the call market.
Consequently, transaction costs are relatively low for smaller firms and relatively high for larger firms, resulting in a flatter relationship between the spread and its stock-specific determinants. This supports the view that the call market is better suited to less liquid stocks. indicating that the high average participation rates are not driven by high values for illiquid stocks.
Participation rates tend to be higher in the closing auction. Together with the results shown in Table 2 this implies that the Makler takes considerable fractions of the large orders matched in the closing auction in his own book. This may be a reflection of his inventory management because he may offset a position accumulated over the trading day in the closing auction. In fact, we found that the position the Makler takes in the closing auction leads to a reduction of his inventory in 58.6% of the cases. This proportion is significantly different from 50% (zvalue 2.81).
The high participation rates documented in Table 4 raise questions about the specific price setting rules used by the Maklers that we will now address. The Makler may use his informational advantage and his price setting latitude either to make profitable trades or to stabilize prices. In the first case one would expect Makler trades to be profitable on average and to increase return volatility. This is the view taken in Stoll / Whaley (1990) . In the second case, the Makler should, on average, earn zero profits on his trades and his participation should result in lower return volatility.
We first address the issue of return volatility. The actual transaction prices are set after inclusion of the Makler trades. The hypothetical price series that we calculated in order to measure the transaction costs exclude the Makler trades. Therefore, comparing the volatility of the corresponding return series allows us to disentangle the impact of the Makler trades. 19 For each sample stock we calculate, using both the actual and the hypothetical transaction price series, four return series. We calculate three 24-hour return series from opening, noon and closing auction prices. We also calculate a return series including all call auction prices. We then related the variance of the hypothetical return series which would have obtained without
Makler participation to the variance of the actual return series. The higher the resulting variance ratio, the more the actual price improves (in the sense of reducing return volatility) on the hypothetical price.
Insert Table 5 about here The variance ratios shown in Table 5 are unanimously larger than one. Thus, Makler participation tends to decrease return volatility. This is consistent with the results Madhavan / Panchapagesan (1998) report for the NYSE.
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The results on return volatility can be combined with the participation rates shown in Table 4 .
If the trades the Makler makes for his own account were destabilizing, we would expect the variance ratio to be negatively correlated to the participation rate. We find, however, that for the opening transaction the variance ratio is positively correlated to the mean participation rate we calculated the average absolute deviation between the call market prices and the continuous auction prices immediately prior to and immediately after the call auction. This was done separately for the hypothetical and the actual call auction prices. Table 6 reports the ratios of these mean absolute deviations. Similar to the variance ratios discussed above, a ratio larger than one indicates that the actual transaction price improves on the hypothetical price. Since the prices of the continuous trading session are affected by bid-ask bounce, we repeated the calculation using the midquotes in effect before and after the call auction. The results were similar to those obtained using transaction prices.
Insert Table 6 about here
The ratios are unanimously larger than one, indicating that the call auction prices actually set by the Makler are closer to the prices of the continuous auction than the hypothetical call auction prices that would have obtained without Makler participation.
We related the deviation ratios depicted in Table 6 to the participation rates shown in Table 4 .
The ratios are (not significantly) positively related to the mean participation rate. A positive relation indicates that higher participation leads to smaller deviations between call market and continuous trading session prices. This adds to the evidence that Makler participation tends to reduce rather than increase return volatility.
Taken together, the results in Table 5 and 22 Shares are valued at the closing price of October 25th, the end of our sample period. We assume a 5% interest rate. We use two benchmarks. The first (termed zero profit benchmark)
is simply zero because we assume zero net investment. The second benchmark (termed equal risk benchmark) is the return on a zero net investment portfolio consisting of the average share holding of the Makler (which may be a long or a short position). The results are shown in Table 7 .
Insert Table 7 about here
The results indicate that the transactions the Maklers make for their own accounts are, on average, not profitable. Measured against the zero profit benchmark, the average profit is DM -7,361 which is not significantly different from zero. Against the equal risk benchmark, the loss is even greater (and statistically significant). This conclusion is insensitive to the choice of the interest rate used to calculate the benchmark.
The result was not caused by a general stock market trend during the sample period. Only three of the stocks had a (positive or negative) cumulative return of more than 3% over the 21 trading days. We therefore interpret our results as indicating that, on average over all stocks, the Maklers do not earn profits on their trades in the call auctions. They may not even receive compensation for the inventory risk they assume. It thus appears that the commissions paid by the investors (which are not included in our calculation) are the Maklers' main source of income.
The figures in Table 7 suggest that the profitability of the Makler trades is related to the total trading volume of the stocks. This is corroborated by a stock-level analysis. We find that the profitability of the Makler trades is negatively correlated to the total trading volume. The correlation is -0.35 for the zero profit benchmark and -0.63 for the equal risk benchmark. The latter value is significantly different from zero at the 5% level. This indicates that gross trading profits are higher the less liquid the stock is. There are two possible explanations for this result.
Competition from the computerized trading system IBIS may limit the ability of the Makler to extract rents from trading liquid stocks. 23 Alternatively, the higher profits for less liquid stocks may be a compensation for higher inventory risk.
This paper provides a detailed analysis of the call auction procedure on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Our data set contains information about all individual orders for a sample of stocks.
We analyze the market share of the call market, the transaction costs in the call market, the impact of auctioneer participation on prices and return volatility, and the profitability of the trades the Maklers make for their own accounts.
We find that the market share of the call market is negatively correlated to market capitalization and trading volume. This is consistent with theoretical arguments implying that call market trading is especially suited to low-volume stocks.
Unlike previous studies our dataset allows us to develop and implement a method to directly measure the execution costs of orders submitted to a call auction. The measure is based on the price impact of an additional order. Using the order book information we first calculate the market clearing price. We then add a market buy or sell order to the book and recalculate the market clearing price. We calculate a bid-ask spread by adding the price impact of a buy order and a sell order of equal size. If the additional orders are small, transaction costs in the call market are lower than the spread in the order book of the continuous market and are of the same order of magnitude as the effective spread in the continuous trading session. If larger additional orders are considered, transaction costs in the call market increase dramatically. This is evidence of insufficient market depth.
These results do not, however, imply that call markets generally suffer from insufficient depth.
Our transaction cost measure is based on hypothetical prices calculated from all orders submitted to the closed order book. This method abstracts from the potentially beneficial function of the Makler. The participation of an intermediary like the Makler may be desirable because he may accommodates order imbalances, increases the liquidity of the market and stabilizes prices. On the other hand, the latitude he enjoys in price setting gives him an incentive to manipulate prices. This may increase return volatility.
Our data set allows us to identify the trades the Makler made for his own account. We can thus eliminate these trades and determine a price that would have obtained without his participation.
Comparing this hypothetical price series to the actual transaction prices we find that Makler participation tends to reduce return volatility. A further analysis shows that the actual prices are much closer to the surrounding prices of the continuous trading session than the hypothetical prices that would have obtained without Makler participation. We calculated the profits associated with the positions taken by the Makler and found that, on average, the Maklers do not earn profits on the positions they take. These results suggest that Makler participation is beneficial. Therefore, recent attempts to introduce intermediaries in the electronic call auctions in the French NSC system and the German XETRA system (see Demarchi / Foucault 1998 for details) may well be a step in the right direction. Analogously, we add a market sell order to the book and calculate the resulting price. The difference between these prices is our spread measure. We choose two different order sizes, one round lot ("small") Both measures may be inappropriate. First, trading volume in two differently organized markets is not necessarily related to the execution costs, particularly if the trading hours in the markets differ. Second, the suitability of the liquidity ratio as a measure of market liquidity has been questioned by Bernstein (1987) and Grossman / Miller (1988) . 2 Brooks / Su (1997) address this problem by re-running the simulation and adding a one-tick penalty to the opening price whenever the trading volume at the opening is no more than ten round lots. Both the magnitude of the simulated transaction cost and the condition under which it is imposed are, however, ad hoc. Unfortunately, neither data on IBIS bid and ask prices nor transactions data revealing the identity of the traders is available. We are therefore unable to provide information on the degree of market making in IBIS.
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They could enter quotes with an identification code that revealed to other market participants that the quote was entered by a Makler. If such quotes were accepted the Makler received courtage; in all other cases he did not receive courtage. Apart from these exceptions, no commissions were payable on trades in IBIS.
8
The 100 stocks forming the indices DAX (the 30 most liquid stocks) and MDAX (a mid-cap index consisting of 70 stocks) were ranked according to their 1994 DM trading volume. We first selected the three stocks with the highest trading volume. We then selected four of the stocks ranking 4-10, two of the stocks ranking 11-20, four of the stocks ranking 21-50, and three of the stocks ranking 51-100. Stocks from these groups were selected randomly.
9
Expected volatility is measured using the VDAX (DAX volatility index) which is calculated on the basis of implied volatilities from index option prices. The average VDAX values for September and October 1996 were 11.29% and 10.95%, respectively, as compared to yearly averages of 14. 6%, 12.5% and 23.4% in 1995, 1996 and 1997. 10 The results for the noon auction and for the total call auction volume may be biased by the fact that odd lot orders can only transact in the noon auction. This potential bias is not present in the figures given for the opening and closing auctions. Each order submitted to one of these auctions was also eligible for the continuous trading sessions. Relating the trading volume in the call markets to the total trading volume including the trading volume in IBIS yields very similar results.
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Similar calculations for market orders cannot be performed because our data set does not contain information on the number of market orders. It only contains the total number of shares offered and sought by these market orders.
12
This argument is the basic intuition behind the model of Kyle (1985) . There, insider profits in the continuous auction are twice as large as those in the single auction.
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Alternatively, we used the price which is closest to the previous transaction price. This alternative price setting rule leads to very similar results.
14 Bear in mind that our transaction cost measure abstracts from the potentially beneficial function of the Makler. It is therefore likely to overstate the actual transaction costs paid by investors at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange.
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Our data set contains the order book immediately before a transaction occurs. If the transaction is triggered by a limit order, the spread in the order book is zero or negative because the limit order that triggered the transaction is already contained in our data set. We eliminated these observations. The book spread reported in Table 3 is thus calculated as the average quoted spread in the order book where an observation is recorded prior to each transaction triggered by a market buy or sell order.
We use the turnover ratio instead of the trading volume because the latter is strongly positively correlated with the market capitalization whereas the turnover ratio is not.
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We also estimated the model including the price level as an additional explanatory variable. The coefficient was, however, not significantly different from zero. We further estimated a model where we allowed the coefficient on the standard deviation to be different for the call market and the continuous market but could not reject the hypothesis that the coefficients were equal.
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The sample stocks are handled by different Maklers. This may explain some of the variation. Our sample is too small to explicitly control for the person of the Makler.
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In some cases the deviation between actual and hypothetical price is very large. This may happen when only limit orders with "unrealistic" (e.g. outdated) limits are in the book. We used a 5% filter to correct these values: whenever the deviation between actual and hypothetical price was more than 5% we replaced the hypothetical price with the actual price. This resulted in replacing 20 hypothetical prices. The filter has a function similar to that of price change limits used on many exchanges.
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Madhavan / Panchapagesan (1998) use a different methodology. They use actual and hypothetical opening prices from the NYSE. They then define a benchmark price (the midquote at 3 pm) and calculate the difference between the log of the (actual and hypothetical) call auction price and the benchmark price. The variance of this price differential for the hypothetical call auction prices is, on average, more than eight times the variance of the price differential for the actual call auction prices. Thus, the actual call auction price which is set by the specialist is a much more accurate estimate of the benchmark price than the hypothetical price calculated from the order book. Our results reported in Table 6 are comparable to those of Madhavan / Panchapagesan (1998). There we also use prices and midquotes from the continuous trading session as a benchmark.
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The large participation rates and the significant impact of Makler participation on return volatility are at odds with our earlier statement that the price setting rules issued by the exchange leave the Makler only limited price setting latitude. A detailed analysis of the prices set by the Maklers revealed that they often set prices that are not inside the interval of market clearing prices determined by the orders in their book. The results in Table 5 and Table 6 indicate that they rather set a price which is more in line with the market conditions as revealed, for example, by the prices in the continuous auction. Often there is large excess demand or supply at these prices. In these cases the Makler has to accommodate the order imbalance which contributes to the high participation ratios we documented. We wish to stress that, prior to the present study, this aspect of the price setting behavior was not publicly known.
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We also calculated Makler profits including the transactions made in the continuous trading session.
The results were similar to those reported here. We therefore conclude that the Maklers do not use the call auctions to lay off inventory accumulated through profitable trading in the continuous trading session.
23
The market share of the computerized trading system IBIS is positively correlated to the total trading volume (see Theissen 1999) . Therefore, competition between floor and screen trading may be more intense for more liquid stocks.
